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We estimate a linear approximation of the market potential function for Europe as derived in 
geography and trade models. Using a spatial econometric estimation approach, border effects 
are identified by a differential impact of other regions purchasing power, depending on 
whether two regions are located within the EU15 or outside the EU15. We find that intra 
EU15-borders have an insignificant but external borders a significant effect on regional wage 
structures. We illustrate the magnitude of EU external border effects by simulating the 
enlargement of the EU in May 2004. Our results suggest a large impact of the border for new 
member states, but a relatively small one for old members. 
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1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the opening-up of the Central and East-
ern European Countries (CEEC) at the beginning of the nineties major steps of
economic integration have been undertaken between the EU, EFTA countries and
the CEEC. Examples are the reduction of tariﬀs and other trade barriers with
the completion of the Europe Agreements and the introduction of a pan-European
cumulative tariﬀ system which replaced the complex system of rules of origin in
the European Union. These steps culminated in the accession of eight countries
from the region in May 2004.
This accession has been associated with a number of concerns amongst which
regional issues and labour market eﬀects ﬁgured most prominently. In the pub-
lic debate concerns about the intensiﬁed competition among border regions have
often been voiced. However, the majority of economic studies so far mainly fo-
cussed on the analysis of wage and employment eﬀects of trade integration for
single countries (speciﬁcally, the US and the UK). The regional perspective still
seems under-researched, although new economic geography models suggest major
regional impacts of integration. These models oﬀer two central predictions on the
spatial structure of wages and the eﬀects of integration on wages in border regions.
First, falling transport costs across national borders (a synonym for integration in
these models) may change the spatial structure of wage rates within a country (see
Krugman and Livas, 1996; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Paluzzie, 2001;
Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran, 2004) as well as between countries. As recently
pointed out for instance by Brülhart, Crozet and Koenig-Souberain (2004), the
reduction in cross border transport costs implied by EU enlargement may changeAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 3
the spatial structure of EU countries and accession countries. Second, economic
geography models predict that regional wage levels follow a non-linear version of
the market potential function proposed by Harris (1954).
In this paper we use these two predictions of economic geography models to
test the signiﬁcance of border eﬀects of EU15-internal and external borders and
thus provide evidence on the size of border eﬀects in the European wage func-
tion. We linearly approximate the non-linear potential function implied by the
core-periphery model to derive a simple linear speciﬁcation (see also Combes and
Lafourcade, 2001 or Mion, 2004). In contrast to the existing literature, which
mainly follows the seminal work by Hanson (2005) for the US and provides a num-
ber of estimations of the market potential function for the EU15 (Niebuhr, 2004,
2005) as well as individual EU countries (Roos, 2001; Brakman, Garretsen and
Schramm, 2004; De Bruyne, 2003; Mion 2004) and groups of EU countries (see
Head and Mayer, 2005) we explicitly model border eﬀects. We argue that in a
European context this extension may be important because on the one hand the
countries in the EU are more strongly integrated than separate nations, but on the
other hand they may not (yet) be fully integrated. This would lead us to expect
some cross border interdependence of wages, which is less pronounced than within
countries.
We estimate our speciﬁcation for a cross-section of NUTSII regions encom-
passing the EU15, the largest new EU member states as well as Switzerland and
Norway. In contrast to the literature on border eﬀects in goods prices and trade
in the EU (see Nitsch, 2000, Beck and Weber, 2003) which ﬁnds sizeable intra EU
border eﬀects, our ﬁndings suggest that the impact of GDP and wages of regions
across borders of countries within the EU15 on regional wage levels does not diﬀerAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 4
signiﬁcantly from that of regions within the same country. However, there are still
substantial border eﬀects with respect to EU external borders.
Finally, we illustrate the size of these EU external border eﬀects by simulating
the imlication of the accession of the CEEC to the EU15 by assuming that in the
long run border eﬀects between EU15 and new member states will converge to
those found currently among the EU15. These calculations suggest that border ef-
fects between the EU15 and accession countries are strongest in the border regions
of the accessions countries, while most regions of the incumbent countries remain
virtually unaﬀected. Overall, our empirical results thus suggest that accounting
for border eﬀects and steady state real wage diﬀerences in market potential es-
timations is important at least when focusing on European countries and that a
reduction of border impediments has particularly strong eﬀects on regions closer
to the EU15 border.
2 THE ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
AND MARKET POTENTIAL FUNCTION
The starting point in deriving our empirical speciﬁcation is the structural mar-
ket potential function which has also been termed the wage function in recent
literature. As pointed out by Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) this func-
tion which relates the nominal wage rate wi in region i (i =1 ...N) to the spatially
weighted sum of purchasing power (in terms of nominal GDP, yi) of its neighboring
regions, has been one of the work horse models of regional science at least since the
seminal work of Harris (1954). This function, however, has recieved its theoretical
foundation only recently in the economic geography models of Krugman (1991a),Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 5
Helpman (1998) and Hanson (2005). These models comprise a diﬀerentiated man-
ufacturing good which is produced under increasing returns and enters utility in
terms of a CES subutility function, and a homogenous good. The overall utility
function is Cobb-Douglas with expenditure shares 0 <µ<1 for the diﬀerentiated
good and 1 − µ for the homogenous one. While the diﬀerentiated good exhibits
transportation costs depending on distance, the homogenous good is costlessly
tradable. The price of the homogenous good is normalized to 1 so that the overall
price index in region i is given by T
µ
i . The relation between the nominal wage rate
wi in region i and the spatially weighted sum of purchasing power is based on the
































where the subscripts i and j index regions and σ > 1 denotes the elasticity of
substitution between any two variants of manufacturing goods.
Equation (1) states that in equilibrium real wages are equalized across all
regions so that there is no incentive for workers to migrate. Forward and backward
linkages induce spatial concentration of workers and ﬁrms and constitute the well
known centripetal and centrifugal forces in the model (Krugman, 1991)1.T h e
equilibrium wage rate of region i is determined by the market potential equation
(2), which forms the basis of our econometric speciﬁcation. Here, region j ss p a t i a l
weight is based on its distance to region i, dij, according to the distance decayAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 6














Following Roos (2001), Mion (2004), Hanson (2005) and Niebuhr (2004) and oth-
ers, we ﬁrst eliminate the empirically unobservable price index (Tj) in equation
(2) to derive an estimable speciﬁcation. For this, we follow the literature and




























We introduce border eﬀects by parametrizing f(dij)σ−1.F o rt h i sw ed e ﬁne three
sets of ij pairs of regions. First, F0 is the set of all region pairs. This set of regions
forms the base against which we measure the border eﬀects. Second, FEU denotes
the set of pairs of regions i and j that are located within the EU15 but in diﬀerent
countries. Third, the set FNEU comprises the all variants of ij pairs, where one
region is located inside the EU15 and the other outside or where both of them
are located in diﬀerent countries outside the EU15. Finally, regional pairs i and
j that are located within the same EU15 or non-EU15 country neither belong to
FEU nor to FNEU. Based on these three sets, we parameterize the distance decay
function f(dij)σ−1 as follows:
f(dij)1−σ =

    
    
(ρ0 + ρEU)e
−αdij
c ij ∈ FEU
(ρ0 + ρNEU)e
−αdij




c ij / ∈ FEU and ij / ∈ FNEU
(5)Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 7
where c =1 + m a x i
 
i =j e−αdij and the parameters ρ0, ρEU, ρNEU measure
t h er e l a t i v eb o r d e re ﬀects. In the presence of EU15 border eﬀects we conjecture
ρEU < 0, ρNEU < 0 and ρEU > ρNEU. Following Mion (2004) we approximate





















This formulation implies that the spatial weight and, hence, the market potential
of a region decreases with its distance to its neighbors, all else equal. A similar
spatial weighting scheme has been proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2005) who
argue that it is less restrictive than a row normalized spatial weighting scheme
used in much of the spatial econometrics literature. From an economic point of
view it is preferable since it implies that the market potential of a region decreases
the further away it is located from the other regions all else equal.2
Next we approximate the left and right hand side of (4) linearly around average
values. In the Appendix3 this approximation is derived as
  wi = K + β1
 
j =i and ij∈F0
Θ0
ij   wj + β2
 
j =i and ij∈FEU
ΘEU
ij   wj (6)
+β3
 
j =i and ij∈FNEU
ΘNEU
ij   wj + β4  yi + β5
 





j =i and ij∈FEU
ΘEU
ij   yj + β7
 
j =i and ij∈FNEU
ΘNEU
ij   yj,
where   xi is the percentage deviation of xi from its mean x (i.e.   x = xi−x
x ,x i ∈Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 8
















1+σ(µ(1+ρ)−1). The spatial decay
functions Θk
ij with k ∈ {0,EU,NEU} are deﬁned in the Appendix .
In vector notation the empirical speciﬁcation can thus be written as
  w = β1W0  w + β2WEU   w + β3WNEU   w +
β4   Y + β5W0   Y + β6WEU   Y + β7WNEU   Y +
γZ + u. (7)
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables entering the regression to proxy for oth-
erwise unobservable price and wage diﬀerences not captured by the model and also
includes the constant (K). W0, WEUand WNEU are the N × N spatial weight-
ing matrices with N being the number of regions. u denotes the vector of errors
which may be spatially autocorrelated such that u = φWu + ε, εj ∼ iid(0,σ2
ε).
Equation (7) forms the basic speciﬁcation of the market potential function which
is estimated below.
Several comments concerning this speciﬁcation are in order. First, in its strict
form the model implies a series of testable non-linear restrictions. In particular,


















ρNEU. We use these restric-
tions to test the validity of the model in its strict form as speciﬁed in (7). Second,
without the restrictions the structural parameters of the market potential function
are not identiﬁed. We have seven relevant estimated parameters, but only ﬁve in
the theoretical model. We thus conﬁne our inference on the signs of the estimatedAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 9
reduced form parameters. In this way, estimating border eﬀects is, however, still
possible. Third, the theoretical model is kept simple and, therefore, it is restrictive.
There are a number of reasons to doubt the validity of the assumptions underlying
equation (4). In particular, the theoretical model assumes real wage equalisation
and identical technologies across regions and countries. This is, of course, unre-
alistic in the context of European data, in particular since our sample contains
Central and Eastern European regions with productivity levels much lower than
the EU15 average Aside from including border eﬀects which account for imperfect
real wage adjustments across national borders, we thus augment our baseline spec-
iﬁcation also by additional variables to control for the fact that real wages may
not equilibrate across regions i.e. violate equation (1). In particular, we assume
that average wages of regions diﬀer due to their economic structure as measured
by the share of agriculture and services in total employment (see also Niebuhr,
2004). Productivity diﬀerentials are captured by country group eﬀects (Eastern
European Countries, Non-EU15-EFTA countries, and EU15 countries which are
the base).
3 DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY
We use data of compensation per employee, nominal gross value added and
sectorial employment for a total of 241 regions provided by Cambridge Economet-
rics which is based on information from the Eurostat New Cronos database. Data
are at the NUTSII level and comprise regions from the EU15 member states and a
subset of the largest new EU member states (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Re-
public) as well as Switzerland and Norway. To avoid problems with non-contingentAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 10
spaces (due to lacking data on the Balkans) we omitted Greece from the data set.
For German regions wage data (compensation per employee) are available only at
the level of NUTSI. Since this would bias our spatial regressions we estimate prox-
ies on NUTSII level using a ﬁxed eﬀects regression with region and time eﬀects
as well as GDP per capita, the share of workers in agriculture, manufacturing,
construction and market services as well as the employment rate as explanatory
variables.4
























shifted due to 
accession own country
Austria 133,3 94,1 16,4 6,2 22,8 70,6 12,3 4,6 17,1
Belgium 370,5 308,0 7,9 0,5 54,7 83,1 2,1 0,1 14,8
Switzerland 183,8 0,0 153,6 0,0 30,2 0,0 83,6 0,0 16,4
Czech Republic 109,2 0,0 105,5 96,6 3,7 0,0 96,6 88,4 3,4
Germany 1111,8 302,3 57,5 15,2 752,0 27,2 5,2 1,4 67,6
Denmark 27,2 21,5 1,3 0,4 4,5 78,8 4,7 1,6 16,4
Spain 62,7 21,6 0,5 0,0 40,6 34,4 0,8 0,0 64,8
Finland 8,4 3,5 0,3 0,1 4,6 41,1 4,0 0,8 54,8
France 379,1 188,7 25,1 0,4 165,3 49,8 6,6 0,1 43,6
Hungary 30,6 0,0 26,5 22,4 4,2 0,0 86,4 73,3 13,6
Ireland 7,9 6,0 0,0 0,0 1,9 75,9 0,2 0,0 23,9
Italy 229,6 79,9 21,5 1,5 128,2 34,8 9,3 0,6 55,8
Luxemburg 33,9 32,4 1,5 0,1 0,0 95,6 4,4 0,2 0,0
Netherlands 356,7 268,9 4,9 0,7 82,9 75,4 1,4 0,2 23,2
Norway 14,5 0,0 9,9 0,0 4,6 0,0 68,4 0,0 31,6
Poland 76,8 0,0 59,8 53,8 17,0 0,0 77,9 70,1 22,1
Portugal 11,9 7,5 0,0 0,0 4,4 63,0 0,1 0,0 37,0
Sweden 26,0 13,6 3,1 0,6 9,3 52,4 11,9 2,4 35,8
U.K. 570,0 172,7 2,7 0,1 394,6 30,3 0,5 0,0 69,2
in percent
Note: Figures are based on the spatial weight wij=exp(-dij/100)/(1+max Wi*) where max Wi* is the maximum of the row sum
of the not normalized spatial weighting matrix
in bn Euro
For estimation we use a cross section of averages over the periods 1999-2002.5
The dependent variable is nominal compensation per employee. Regional income
(purchasing power), is approximated by nominal gross value added. Additional
controls are the share of workers in agriculture, in market and in non market ser-
vices (manufacturing and construction being the base) as well an EFTA (Switzer-
land and Norway) and a CEEC-dummy (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 11
Finally, distance is measured as the crow ﬂy distance between the capitals of each
NUTSII region.
Table 1 displays the distance weighted purchasing power (gross value added;
GVA) of all accessible regions aggregated to the country level (column 1). Column
2 reports the average distance weighted purchasing power of regions either located
in another country but within the EU15 (i.e. the members of FEU)a n dc o l u m n3
that in diﬀerent countries outside the EU15 (i.e. the members of FNEU), while the
mass of purchasing power aﬀected by the EU accession of Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland is reported in column 4. The residual in column 5 gives the purchasing
power of the regions in their own country. Columns 6 - 8 report the corresponding
breakdown in percent. This table corroborates the results of Brülhart, Crozet and
Koenig-Souberain (2004) and of Niebuhr (2004) which indicate that the additional
market potential provided by the new EU member states to the existing EU15’s
market is small relative to the potential for the old member states. Austria,
Sweden and Germany are the countries to gain most in terms of market potential
by enlargement, but even here the market potential outside the EU15 amounts to
less than 5 percent.
For countries more distant to the new member states, such as Spain or Portu-
gal, the additional market potential in the new member states is negligeable. In
contrast, a substantial amount of the market potential for the new member states
is located in the old EU member states. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland more than 70 percent of the total market potential is located in regions of
the EU15.
A speciﬁc problem of the market potential function based on the above model is
that many right hand side variables are endogenous. First, the model is not closedAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 12
so that it ignores the fact that the income of a region is endogenous. Second,
W0  w, WEU   w, and WNEU  w are endogenous as the vector of wage rates   w shows
up on the left and in a spatially weighted form also on the right hand side of the
regression. To overcome these endogeneity problems we apply the spatial GM-
estimator of Kelejian and Prucha (1999), proceeding in three steps. Based on
an initial (IV) regression, we ﬁrst estimate the model assuming φ =0by 2SLS
which provides consistent estimates of the parameters and the residuals. Second,
we estimate the spatial correlation parameter φ using the ﬁrst stage residuals to
solve the GM-conditions put forward by Kelejian and Prucha (1999). Third, the
ﬁnal estimation results are derived using a Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation
v∗
i (  φ)=[ ( I −   φW)v]i for all variables in the model and applying 2SLS on the
transformed data. Kelejian and Prucha (1999) show that this procedure leads to
consistent estimates in the presence of spatially correlated errors. They suggest
to use the spatially lagged values of all untransformed exogenous variables as
instruments. In addition, we also use other outside instruments for a region’s
nominal income (see Tables 2 and 3). However, we include only those instruments
which pass the Sargan overidentifcation test. Shea’s R2 as well as as F-tests show
that these instruments are relevant.
We estimate several diﬀerent models to see whether our estimation results are
robust. Model 1 is a reduced form (ignoring spatially weighted wage rates) and
treats regional income as an exogenous variable.6 Model 2 is the same as Model
1, but with regional income endogenous. Model 3 is the unrestricted structural
form, which includes W0  w, WEU   w, and WNEU  w,w h i l eM o d e l4a c c o u n t sf o r
the restrictions as illustrated above. In both Models 3 and 4 regional income is also
endogenous and instrumented properly. Although subject to nonlinear restrictions,Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 13
Model 4 is linear in the variables, so in the ﬁr s ts t a g ew ec a nu s eO L Sp r o j e c t i n g
all variables on the instruments and the exogenous variables. The second stage
utilizes the ﬁrst stage predictions of the endogenous variables and applies NLSQ
to account for the nonlinear parameter restrictions mentioned above.7 In spatial
econometric models the spatial decay parameter α is usually a ﬁxed parameter.
We set α =1 /100 (see Table 2).8 The estimation results also indicate signiﬁcant
spatial correlation of the error term (as evidenced by the signiﬁcant Moran I-test
of Kelejian and Prucha, 2001) so that the GM approach is indeed required.
4R E S U L T S
The results (in Table 2) suggest that our control variables work well, indicat-
ing substantiality lower wages in the CEEC and higher ones in Switzerland and
Norway (EFTA) as compared to the EU15. In addition, wages are signiﬁcantly
higher in regions with a high share of workers in market services, but lower in
agricultural regions. Furthermore, experimentation with other variables suggest
that the estimates are similar if we include a density indicator such as popula-
tion per square kilometer to capture this eﬀect.9 Also, the instruments work well
enough to allow inferences on border eﬀects, although some parameters (mostly
those of the instrumented variables or of the income variables) are aﬀected by
multicollinearity. Speciﬁcally, in the unrestricted structural form models (model
3) this problem seems relevant.
Moving to the parameter estimates of our regressions we ﬁnd a robust and
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of own regional income. This eﬀect is however, smaller
than that of other regions in the same country in all speciﬁcations. This is notAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 14
in line with theory which assumes zero transportation costs within a region and,
hence, the highest impact of demand on wages. One of the reasons for this some-
what unexpected result could be the correlation with the other controls such as
W0y. While this result is unexpected, our results concerning the estimates of the
reduced form parameters (model 1 and 2) suggest that the impact of gross value
a d d e do fr e g i o n sl o c a t e di nd i ﬀerent countries of the EU15 (i.e. the members of
FEU) on regional wages is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect of equidistant
regions in the same country. This implies that the hypothesis that the spatially
weighted purchasing power of all regions and the spatially weighted purchasing
power of regions in other EU countries exert the same impact cannot be rejected
in the reduced form Models 1 and 2. According to these estimates national borders
within the EU do not seem to be a major impediment to spillovers in the demand
potential of other regions. This stylized fact also carries over to the model when
considering the restricted full speciﬁcation in model 4. In this case too the impact
the impact of gross value added of regions located in diﬀerent countries of the
EU15 on regional wages is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect of equidistant
regions in the same country.
The only model which disagrees with our ﬁnding of relatively small within
EU15 border eﬀects is Model 3. This model suggests that cross border wage ef-
fects within the EU15 are substantially lower than within countries, while with
r e g a r dt oi n c o m e ,w eg e tt h eo p p o s i t er e s u l t . 10 This ﬁnding is diﬃcult to inter-
pret from a theoretical perspective. It seems to be mainly due to econometric
problems with the speciﬁcation and the instruments. As mentioned above, the
parameters (in particular those of the instrumented variables) of this speciﬁcation
are strongly aﬀected by multicollinearity which makes inferences based on thisAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 15
model problematic.
bz bz bz bz
W
0w - - - - 0,290 0,73 0,702 1,71 +
W
EUw - - - - -0,940 -2,68 *** -0,258 -0,84
W
NEUw - - - - -3,152 -3,60 *** -1,309 -1,90 *
y 0,044 4,3 *** 0,093 1,92 * 0,064 3,88 *** 0,035 2,21 **
W
0y 0,420 3,3 *** 0,364 2,62 *** 0,560 3,70 *** 0,313 2,15 **
W
EUy 0,295 1,5 0,468 1,64 * 0,806 2,96 *** -0,115
- a)
W
NEUy -0,671 -2,2 *** -0,396 -0,89 0,821 1,55 + -0,583
- a)
Share of workers, non-market services -0,086 -1,4 + -0,040 -0,50 -0,062 -0,98 -0,149 -2,33 **
Share of workers, market services 0,420 5,3 *** 0,293 2,10 ** 0,379 4,67 *** 0,422 4,86 ***
Share of workers, agriculture -0,033 -2,2 ** -0,027 -1,58 + -0,035 -2,37 *** -0,039 -2,45 **
East -0,657 -11,3 ** -0,650 -11,46 *** -0,439 -5,48 *** -0,537 -6,70 ***
Efta 0,514 8,52 ** 0,508 8,12 *** 0,391 5,57 *** 0,487 7,91 ***
R
2 0,74 0,74 0,84 0,83
  0,03 0,03 0,03 -
  4,26 4,60 5,60 -
Moran I (p-value) 0,000 0,000 0,000 -
Instruments
 Relevance: Shea partial R
2 for W
ow - - 0,870 -
 Relevance: Shea partial R
2 for W
EUw - - 0,826 -
 Relevance: Shea partial R
2 for W
NEUw - - 0,587 -
 Relevance: Shea partial R
2 for y - 0,046 0,337 -
 Validity, Sargan test (p-value) - 0,217 0,127 -
 Endogeneity, Wu-Hausman (p-value) - 0,284 0,285 -
F-tests on border effects (p-value)
w:  EU=0,  non-EU=0 - - 0,001 0,085
w:  EU= non-EU - - 0,003 0,170
y:  EU=0,  non-EU=0 0,013 0,012 0,012
y:  EU= non-EU 0,003 0,012 0,903 -
Implied theoretical restriction - - - 0,026
Notes: In model 1 y is exogneous, while it is endogenous in models 2-4. W
0w, W
EUw and W
NEUw are always treated as endogenous
variables. Instruments comprise spatially lagged values of the exogenous variables. In models 2-4 additionally, country GDP, area, density
and the employment rate (share of employed in total population) are used to instrument y. The instruments have been choosen so that the
Sargan test in the second stage did not reject. All estimates and its standard errors are corrected for spatially autocorrelated errors follwing
Kelejian and Prucha (1999). Spatial weigths are Wij=exp(-dij/100)/(1+max Wi
*) where max Wi
* is the maximum of the row of spatial
weighting matrix whic is not normalized ; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%; +significant at 15%; a) Implied by
restriction.
model 1: reduced form, 
OLS
Table 2: Estimates of the spatial market potential function 
 Dependent variable is nominal wage rate, averages 1999-2002,  =1/100
model 2: reduced form, 
IV
model 3: structural form, 
IV 
model 4: restricted 
structural form, IV
Thus while EU15 internal borders do not seem to be a major impediment to
cross border spillovers in the regional wage structure, the diﬀerential impact of the
spatially weighted purchasing power of regions from within the EU15 as compared
to regions outside the EU15 is robust and substantial. In all estimated speciﬁ-
cations (again with the exception of regional income in Model 3) the impact of
the purchasing power of EU15 regions (WEU) on wages in other EU15 regions is
signiﬁcantly higher than observed with EU15-external borders (WNEU). Further-Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 16
more, in all models, with the mentioned exception of Model 3, the corresponding
parameters are signiﬁcantly smaller than zero. This is observed in both the co-
eﬃcients of spatially weighted wage rates and in spatially weighted income. The
F-test of no external EU15 border eﬀects rejects in all but one cases (which again
is model 3). Thus the general view emerges that spatial spillovers in wages and
income levels across external borders of the EU15 are substantially lower than
across EU15-internal borders.
Our results so far indicate that the impact of GDP of regions across borders of
countries within the EU15 on regional wage levels in general does not statistically
diﬀer from that of regions within the same country. Our results, however, also
suggest that external borders of the EU15 are a major impediment to trade and
factor mobility, leading to pronounced extra-EU15 border eﬀects irrespective of the
speciﬁcation chosen. To illustrate the size of these eﬀects, we perform a simulation,
using the estimated coeﬃcient of the within EU15 vs. EU15 - non EU15 market
potential model for the most recent enlargement episode of the new member states
of the EU in our sample (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).
We base these simulations on the cross section estimation results reported
in Table 2 by setting up an experiment of thought, asking how big the additional
c h a n g ei nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo fw a g e sw o u l dh a v ebe e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo fE U 1 5e x t e r n a l
border eﬀects as compared to the base of a 14 % increase in nominal wages over
1991-2002 in the sample. In this way, we are able to base our projections on the
estimated linear approximation without relying on level information which cannot
be inferred from the estimated model. Since these simulations are based on cross-
section estimates the resulting wage eﬀects reﬂect long run adjustments. Also,
they reﬂect the inﬂuence of market potential and the change in border eﬀectsAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 17
due to accession only, ignoring other major inﬂuences like productivity changes
or pressures on factor price equalization resulting from increased and liberalized
trade.








Austria 1 49,53            1,09 0,57          
Belgium 2 36,27            0,07           0,04          
Switzerland 3            64,89           0,00           0,00
Czech Republic 4 -77,00 27,97 13,03
Germany 5 14,92            0,78           0,41          
Denmark 6 44,48            0,23           0,12          
Spain 7 -15,65            0,00           0,00          
Finland 8 17,37            0,02           0,01          
France 9 36,01            0,03           0,02          
Hungary 10 -74,02 12,20 5,69
Ireland 11 1,45            0,00           0,00          
Italy 12 -12,44            0,19           0,10          
Luxemburg 13 65,41            0,10           0,05          
Netherlands 14 8,04            0,13           0,07          
Norway 15            45,20           0,00           0,00
Poland 16 -78,70 11,96 5,70
Portugal 17 -54,22            0,00           0,00          
Sweden 18 33,79            0,12           0,07          
U.K. 19 7,27            0,01           0,00          
Note: GDP per capita is weighted by population;  wage changes are weighted by the nominal wage rate
 GDP per capita-devation 
from EU-mean 
hypothetical growth 
differential in percentage 
points, structural form, 
model 4
hypothetical growth 
differential in percentage 
points, reduced form, model 
2
Figure 1 (at the end of the text) presents the simulated wage eﬀects in the
form of a map. Table 3 summarizes the simulation results at the level of countries.
Three main ﬁndings emerge. First, wage eﬀects due to a reduction of cross border
transport costs (border eﬀe c t s )i nt h ep r o c e s so fE Ue n l a r g e m e n ta r eo fam u c h
higher magnitude for the new EU member states in the sample than for EU15
countries. Second, regions closest to the borders of the ”old” and ”new” EU are to
gain most in terms of wage increases. Third, the combination of larger wage eﬀects
in the new member states and in border regions implies that regional disparitiesAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 18
in wage rates within the new member states are likely to increase as well, since
border regions have also been preferred regions in the period before accession11
In particular, our simulations suggest that wage growth in regions in the new
member states near to the EU15 border should have been by 12 to 27 percentage
points (Model 2) or 6 to 13 percentage points (Model 4) higher, relative to the
actual development, if border eﬀects had been of the same magnitude as within
the EU15. The impact on EU15 regions is of substantially smaller magnitude
and changes of relevant size are predicted for Austria and Germany only. Finally,
regions more distant from the borders of the EU15 are more or less unaﬀected.
The results of Model 2 for the EU15 countries indicate the most pronounced wage
eﬀects for Austria (1.1 percentage points), followed by Germany (0.8), Denmark,
Sweden and Italy. Within the group of the three new member countries, the Czech
Republic is to be most aﬀected.
5C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper we estimate a linear approximation of the market potential func-
tion as derived from geography and trade models. This model relates the wage
rate in a region to its own and the spatially weighted purchasing power of the
other regions. Using a spatial econometric estimation approach, we identify bor-
der eﬀects diﬀering between regions (i) in diﬀerent countries within the EU15 or
(ii) outside the EU15. In contrast to the existing literature, we thus explicitly
model border eﬀects and potential diﬀerences in steady state real wage levels.
Our major ﬁndings with respect to these estimates suggest that the impact
of GDP and wages of regions across borders of countries within the EU15 onAuh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 19
regional wage levels does not diﬀer from that of regions within the same country.
However, there are still substantial border eﬀects with respect to external borders
of the EU15. External borders of the EU15 are a major impediment to trade
and factor mobility, leading to pronounced extra-EU15 border eﬀects irrespective
of the speciﬁcation chosen. In consequence EU-integration may have substantial
eﬀects on the wage structures of individual countries. To illustrate the size of these
eﬀects, we perform a simulation, using the estimated coeﬃcient of the within EU15
vs. EU15 - non EU15 market potential model for the most recent enlargement
episode of the new member states of the EU in our sample. This simulation
exercise suggests that the accession may lead to pronounced wage eﬀects in the
new member states, which get better access to a big market potential.Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 20
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Denoting   xi as the percentage deviation of xi from its mean x (i.e.   x = xi−x
x ,x i ∈
{πi,w i,y i}) and substituting for
 N
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ij ∈ FNEU. Collecting terms and rearranging gives the basic speciﬁcation to be
estimated:
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Notes
1The Helpman (1998) version of the model includes housing prices as an addi-
tional determinant of nominal wages. We skip them to simplify the exposition as
they are unobserved in our data.
2To see this consider a region with a distance of say 500 kilometers to all other
regions and compare it to a second one, which is located 1000 km away from
the other regions. With a row normalized spatial weighting matrix both regions
exhibit the same distribution of spatial weights. Hence, both regions face the same
market potential which is at odds with the theoretical model. In our setting, the
second region exhibits a smaller market potential, because it is more distant to
the others regions as compared to the ﬁrst one.
3The linear approximation of the market potential function is a common strat-
egy in applied work (see Combes and Lafourcade, 2001 and Mion, 2003 for recent
examples.)
4We checked whether this procedure changes qualitative results and found that
this is not the case
5This choice was guided by the combination of data availability and the attempt
to eliminate some of the short run ﬂuctuations from the data as well as basing
estimates on the most recent time period available.
6This ‘reduced form’ may also be interpreted as an estimate of the market
potential function as originally formulated by Harrs (1954).Auh wkhuh Brughu Eiihfwv lq wkh EU Wdjh Fxqfwlrq? 26
7For Model 4 the estimates of φ are those derived for Model 3.
8We also looked at a number of smaller spatial decays to check for robustness
of our results. In general this does not have a strong impact om ﬁndings.Since,
speciﬁcations with α =1 /100 produce the best ﬁt, we concentrate on this case.
9These results are available from the authors upon request.
10With these parameter estimates it is no surprise that Model 3 rejects the
restrictions imposed on Model 4, although not at an 1% level of signiﬁcance.
11These qualitative results are consistent with estimtes in Niebuhr (2004) based
on a model estimated for the EU15 regions.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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